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LIMITING INNOVATION THROUGH
WILLFUL BLINDNESS
Timothy Wiseman*
I. INTRODUCTION
All of copyright law exists primarily to benefit the public; compensation
and rewards to the creators and authors who drive culture and knowledge for-
ward are significant, but secondary goals.1 These purposes of copyright create
tensions within the policy of the law.2 Increasing the protections provided by
copyright law can lead to greater incentives for artists to create and for copy-
right owners to continue to build on their intellectual property, which is clearly
good for both the creators and the public at large.3 But such protections restrict
the way others can use those creations and can limit members of the public and
subsequent creators who may want to use those pieces of culture in new works
or to create new technologies and services, which may interact with copy-
righted works.4
The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) reflects this ten-
sion between the need to provide authors and creators with compensation and
some control over their creations while protecting technological innovators and
Internet service providers from potentially crushing liability exposure due to
the actions of their users.5 One way Congress struck this balance was by pro-
viding safe harbors that shielded service providers from liability for content
posted by their users, but requiring the service providers to meet several condi-
tions in order to keep that protection.6 One of those conditions was that the
service provider must remove any content that it knew to be infringing, or that
it knew had red flags making infringement obvious, or where the service pro-
vider was properly notified by the rights-holder of infringement.7 In its dispute
with YouTube, Viacom urged that the equitable doctrine of willful blindness
should be applied to impute knowledge of infringement or knowledge of red
flags of infringement to YouTube and to strip YouTube of its safe harbor
protections.8
* Note. Timothy Wiseman is a third-year law student at the William S. Boyd School of Law
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I would like to thank Professor Marketa Trimble for
assistance and guidance in preparing this note. I would also like to thank Miriam Meyer-
Thompson and the staff of the Nevada Law Journal for their skill and expertise in editing.
1 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 48–49 (2008).
3 Id. at 48.
4 Id. at 48–49.
5 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
7 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
8 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Permitting willful blindness to substitute for notice or actual knowledge
would weaken the safe harbors and undo the careful balance struck in the
DMCA.9 Applying the willful blindness doctrine would reduce clarity for the
service providers as to when they have protection and when they do not, which
will make them substantially more hesitant to allow user supplied content.10
Further, it would be likely to lead to additional litigation and may encourage
service providers to settle cases that they would otherwise defend in court.11
Applying the equitable doctrine of willful blindness here could discourage
innovation in the still developing field of Internet services and particularly for
Internet services that permit user interaction.12
This Note will argue that it is never appropriate to apply the equitable
willful blindness doctrine to remove the safe harbors provided by the DMCA.
Part II will look at the purpose and the history behind the safe harbors provided
by the DMCA. Part II will also examine how it has protected innovation on the
Internet. Part III will examine the way courts have construed the red flag provi-
sion in DMCA interpretations of similar matters. In particular, it will look at
the nuanced view of the red flag provision and the willful blindness doctrine
that the Second Circuit articulated. Part IV will examine how willful blindness
could lead to uncertainty for companies in the business arena and have a poten-
tially chilling effect on innovation, investment, and the development of new
services. Part V will compare safe harbors to the laws in other countries and see
how those other laws have affected business in those countries. Finally, Part VI
will argue that it is in the best interest of the public to preserve the balance
created by Congress by utterly rejecting the application of willful blindness as a
substitute for actual knowledge within the context of the DMCA.
II. INNOVATION, COPYRIGHT, AND THE DMCA SAFE HARBORS
A. The Evolution of the DMCA Safe Harbors
Advances in technology have long driven changes in copyright law and
often lead to challenges by copyright holders.13 This played out recently in the
reaction of the movie industry to videocassette recorders (VCRs) in general and
Betamax in particular.14 When VCRs first developed, the movie industry peti-
tioned Congress to pass new laws to tax the sale of VCRs to compensate for
possible copyright infringement.15 When that effort failed, the movie industry
9 See infra Part II.A.
10 See David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the
Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten-years
-later/.
11 See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4–5 (1990) (discussing how increased uncertainty as to the merits
of a case place pressure upon defendants to settle even if they believe the claims may not be
meritorious).
12 See Kravets, supra note 10; see also infra Part IV.
13 See BOYLE, supra note 2, at 63–64; see also White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1908) (discussing a claim that piano rolls for self-playing pianos
violated the copyright on sheet music).
14 BOYLE, supra note 2, at 63–64.
15 Id. at 63.
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instead sued, attempting to have the technology itself declared illegal.16 This
led to a landmark decision by the Supreme Court that found the VCR legal and
thus encouraged others in the technology sector to continue innovating in ways
that could possibly make infringement even easier.17 Similarly, when faced
with the introduction of digital audio tape technology, the music industry, like
the movie industry, filed suit.18 This time, however, Congress stepped in and
developed a regulatory scheme that attempted to balance the benefits of the
new technology with the possible effects on copyright holders and thus,
advanced all policies of copyright.19
These and similar changes to copyright law, spurred on by changes in
technology, set the stage for the introduction of a compromise between Internet
service providers and content producers that was codified in the DMCA.20 The
DMCA Title II, also called the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limita-
tion Act, attempts to strike an appropriate balance between the technology and
copyright industries.21 Congress found the proper balance by examining the
precedent that had arisen through the court system thus far,22 as well as by
overseeing negotiations between the technology and content industries.23 The
DMCA is an expansive bill that regulates many interactions between technol-
ogy and copyright, but this Note focuses on the implications of safe harbors
provided to service providers for information stored by a service provider at the
request of a user and for information location tools.24
16 Id. at 63–64; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
419–20 (1984).
17 There the court adopted a view that the technology had “substantial noninfringing uses”
and saved the VCR as a legal technology. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
18 Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 116 (2004).
19 See id. at 116–17 (stating that Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
which immunized against most liability, but provided for a levy on the sale of the devices
and blank media which would be distributed to the copyright holders).
20 See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Take-
down Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 631, 635 (2006).
21 See id. at 621; H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998).
22 The safe harbor provisions and the protections from direct liability for service providers
were heavily influenced by the decision in Netcom, “the leading and most thoughtful judicial
decision” on the topic up to that point. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998). In
Netcom, the court considered the copyright implications of the works of L. Ron Hubbard
being posted on a Usenet newsgroup, which was accessed through Netcom. Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365–66 (N.D. Cal.
1995). The court concluded that the service provider couldn’t be held directly liable for the
actions of its users because the servicer lacked control of its users’ actions and thus such
liability was unnecessary. Id. at 1372–73. The court further found that Netcom could not be
held liable for vicarious infringement, but left open the possibility of Netcom being liable
under contributory copyright infringement if certain factors were met. Id. at 1373–77.
23
“Title II, for example, reflects 3 months of negotiations supervised by Chairman Hatch
and assisted by Senator Ashcroft among the major copyright owners and the major OSP’s
and ISP’s.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 9 (1998).
24 Information location tools are dealt with in 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) and would include tools
like search engines. The safe harbor for content stored at the direction of a user and for
information location tools is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (2012). Other related safe
harbors are provided for transitory communications and for system caching, but those are not
involved in the notice and takedown scheme. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(b). Other sections of the
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The safe harbors of the DMCA provide some protection from liability for
service providers, but require the service provider to meet several conditions in
order to receive the protection of these safe harbors.25 The service provider
would need to participate in a notice-and-takedown arrangement in which they
would remove any infringing content when presented with a valid notice from
the copyright holder.26 They would also have to remove any material they
knew was infringing or for which there were circumstances that made the
infringement obvious.27 In other words, they would have to remove any content
for which there were red flags indicating infringement.28 In order to facilitate
the protection of the intellectual property, the service providers are required to
refrain from interfering with standard technical measures to locate or protect
intellectual property.29 The service providers also need to establish a desig-
nated agent who would receive and process the notifications sent to them.30 To
help limit repeated infringement, providers need to develop and enforce a pol-
icy to terminate the accounts of those who repeatedly violate copyright and to
warn their users about this policy.31
In order to reduce mistakes or abuse of the system and avoid striking
down legitimate speech, the notice-and-takedown scheme includes provisions
for counter-notices.32 When a service provider receives a takedown notice, the
service provider would be required to attempt to contact the user who had
posted the allegedly infringing material.33 The user would then have an oppor-
tunity to submit a counter-notice, which would allege that the original notice
was in error and provide sufficient information for the content owner to file suit
along with an agreement that the user would accept service of process and
jurisdiction of the court if a suit was filed.34 After receiving the counter-notice,
the service provider would repost or re-enable access to the material unless it
was notified that the content owner had actually filed suit.35
In creating the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, Congress expressly
attempted to encourage the technology service providers to work with the copy-
right industry to ensure that the law safeguarded copyrights, while addressing
the concerns of the technology industry regarding secondary liability and pro-
DMCA deal with matters such as circumventing digital rights management technologies,
which was codified in 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
25 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d), (i) (2012).
26 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d).
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 624–26. Significantly, service providers
were only required to deal with infringing material they became aware of; they were explic-
itly not required to monitor or look for such material. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012).
29 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2012).
30 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
31 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). Google provides one example of a company that has actually
terminated accounts in response to repeated allegations of infringement. Nate Anderson, The
Day the Music Blogs Died: Behind Google’s Musicblogocide, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 15,
2010, 4:24 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/02/the-day-the-music-blogs-died
-behind-googles-musicblogocide/.
32 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012).
33 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B).
34 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
35 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C).
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viding clarity for the service providers to know how to operate legally.36 This
law helped to clarify the steps service providers needed to take to avoid liability
for infringing material posted by their users, thus reducing uncertainty for inno-
vators and investors.37 It provided this certainty and this protection specifically
to encourage innovation because, as Senator Ashcroft said, providing some pro-
tection for liability in the copyright arena “is a key notion for the future growth
and development of digital communications and most importantly the
Internet.”38 At the same time, the DMCA provided the content industry with a
simple tool to arrange for their content to be removed without going through
the court system.39 Being able to swiftly have infringing content removed per-
mitted content owners to limit the damage from unauthorized distribution of
that infringing content, which is significant since those damages can grow as
time passes.40 Although this notice-and-takedown system was subject to
counter-notices, these counter-notices required the user to reveal information
that would make it easier for the copyright holder to sue them.41
B. Shielding Innovation with the DMCA
The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA provided much needed clarity to
service providers that let them move forward with innovative new services
fearlessly.42 The DMCA was so significant that some commentators described
it as saving the web.43 Valuable services such as WordPress, which provides a
blogging platform, and MySpace, an early social network, would likely not
exist without the protections provided by the safe harbors.44 Later, more inno-
vative services such as Dropbox may not have been developed at all without
the certainty provided by these early examples.45
By providing a legislatively approved mode of cooperation between online
service providers and content creators, Congress helped streamline the process
36 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
37 Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 631–32; H.R. REP. NO.105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998).
38 144 CONG. REC. S4,889 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-05-14/pdf/CREC-1998-05-14-senate.pdf.
39 Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 636; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
40 Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, DMCA
Notifications, and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777,
781–82 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653965.
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3); see also supra text accompanying notes 33–34. Even if the user
sends a counter-notice promptly, the law requires that the allegedly infringing material be
unavailable for at least ten days. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C). If the copyright holder who filed
the initial notice does file with a court to request an injunction, then the service provider
does not need to re-enable access to the content. Id. Interestingly, this can be asymmetrical
as the service provider is not required to provide all such information for the copyright
holder to the alleged infringer. Trimble, supra note 40, at 805.
42 Kravets, supra note 10.
43 Id.; Ashkan Karbasfrooshan, Why Big Media Is Going Nuclear Against the DMCA, TECH-
CRUNCH (Nov. 6, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/06/big-media-nuclear-dmca/.
44 Kravets, supra note 10.
45 Brian Leary, Note, Safe Harbor Startups: Liability Rulemaking Under the DMCA, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1140–41 (2012). That note argues that some protection is essential for
innovative services like Dropbox, but that the DMCA provides too much protection and a
regulatory body should be available to fine-tune those protections as new services arise and
change. Id. at 1135, 1140–41.
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of the two industries working together to protect copyright while still permit-
ting innovation.46 Moreover, by providing clarity, Congress emboldened ser-
vice providers and technological innovators.47 Small, young companies often
cannot afford the cost of litigation even when they are confident, due to prece-
dent, that they would emerge from such litigation victorious.48 By codifying
and clarifying the details of what a service provider needs to do to avoid secon-
dary liability, Congress helped to prevent a great deal of expensive and waste-
ful litigation. Codified protections also encouraged investments in many of
these innovative, small startups that likely would never have been funded and
therefore never given a chance to exist without the explicit protection of the
DMCA’s safe harbors.49
It was likely no overstatement to say that the DMCA, and in particular its
safe harbor provisions, saved the web as we know it today.50 Without the safe
harbor provisions, social networking would likely not exist, and blogging
would probably be confined to those who could host their own servers rather
than being readily accessible to the masses at virtually no cost.51 Without the
safe harbor provisions, the nascent field of cloud computing would likely have
been strangled in the crib, or at least stunted and twisted to carefully fit the
confines of the most recent court case.52 Without the safe harbor provisions
being codified, Google most likely would have refused to purchase YouTube
due to the obvious concerns about secondary liability that such a service model
provides.53
III. RED FLAGS AND WILLFUL BLINDNESS
The DMCA places several restrictions upon service providers that wish to
receive the protection provided by its safe harbors.54 Among other require-
ments, it insists that service providers remove any infringing material which the
46 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076
(9th Cir. 2004) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).
47 Certainty and clarity regarding liability were explicit goals of the DMCA. H.R. REP. NO.
105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50.
48 According to a survey by the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the
median cost to see a copyright infringement suit through to trial with more than twenty-five
million dollars at stake was approximately $1,375,000. STEVEN M. AUVIL & DAVID A.
DIVINE, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 35 (2011). The mean or average cost for
the same suit was approximately two million dollars. Id. at 37.
49 Encouraging investment was an explicit goal of the Senate. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8–9
(1998). There is evidence that this worked and encouraged companies to innovate and inves-
tors to invest. See, e.g., Karbasfrooshan, supra note 43.
50 Kravets, supra note 10.
51 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Elec. Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/issues
/dmca (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) [hereinafter EFF]; see Kravets, supra note 10.
52 Although not dealing with a claim regarding the DMCA’s safe harbors, Aereo has chosen
to use numerous antennas instead of a single efficient antenna specifically in an attempt to
fall within the confines of previous court rulings on copyright matters. See Rip Empson,
Aereo Actually Has a Shot at Beating the Broadcast Networks, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 5,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/05/aereo-for-the-win/.
53 Scott Cleland, Google’s Piracy Liability, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2011, 8:49AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2011/11/09/googles-piracy-liability/.
54 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012).
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service provider knows about or any material where the service provider is
“aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”55
This requires the service provider to remove the content when they are aware of
red flags that would make it obvious to a reasonable person that the content is
infringing.56 Courts have generally interpreted the red flag provision narrowly
and in a way that continues to provide service providers with certainty in what
is required to retain the safe harbor protections.57 However, in its dispute with
YouTube, Viacom urged the court to adopt the equitable doctrine of willful
blindness to imply knowledge when the service providers are aware that
infringement is highly likely and decide not to investigate.58 Adopting that doc-
trine would make it less clear when a service provider could be liable and thus
have a chilling effect on the development of certain types of Internet services.59
A. The Narrow Reading of the Red Flags Provision
The red flag provision of the DMCA requires a service provider that wants
the protection of the safe harbors to act “expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to” infringing material if they become aware of material that is sur-
rounded by “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is appar-
ent.”60 This means that the service provider must remove any material
surrounded by red flags of infringement.61 This provision has been litigated
several times, and the courts generally take a narrow view of it.62 In the recent
dispute between Viacom and YouTube in the Second Circuit, the court said that
the red flag provision required the service provider to act to remove content
only when it was aware of circumstances that “would have made the specific
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious.”63 In that dispute, the court examined the
distinction between the actual knowledge requirement and red flag knowledge
that would trigger the red flag provision.64 The court found that actual knowl-
edge in this context was a subjective standard that required the service provider
to know that specific material was infringing.65 Red flag knowledge, in con-
trast, was an objective standard that required the service provider to have
knowledge of circumstances that made it clear that specific material was
infringing.66 The court emphasized that either standard required the knowledge
to involve specific content and found that any reading that would have required
55 Id.
56 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31–32 (2d
Cir. 2012).
57 See discussion infra Part III.A.
58 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 34.
59 See discussion infra Part IV.
60 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
61 See id.
62 See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31; Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102,
1111–14 (9th Cir. 2007); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D.
Cal. 2009).
63 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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the service provider to act on general knowledge that there was some infringing
content was contrary to the language of the DMCA.67
The trend whereby most courts read the red flag provision narrowly, thus
placing most of the burden for identifying infringing content on the content
owner,68 seems to be consistent with congressional intent. Although Congress
intended for copyright holders to work together with online service providers, it
deliberately ensured that most of that burden had to be met by the content
owner.69 Some courts have been generally reluctant to even impose knowledge
of copyright infringement upon a service provider when they receive defective
notices from a copyright holder.70 The Ninth Circuit considered a dispute
between Perfect 10, which is a creator and distributor of adult content, and
several Internet service providers.71 Perfect 10 had sent letters informing the
Internet service providers, including CCBill, that their clients were infringing
on Perfect 10’s copyright and demanded removal; however, these letters did not
conform to the requirements laid out in the DMCA.72 The court, in an oft-cited
decision, found that these imperfect notices were not sufficient to provide
effective notice to require removal or to require the service provider to look
further into the matter.73 The court noted that the notice-and-takedown schema
places “the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the poten-
tially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely
on the owners of the copyright.”74 The court further stated that names for prov-
iders that included the words “illegal” and “stolen” did not necessarily create a
red flag, since those names may be intended to “increase their salacious appeal”
and may not actually indicate infringement.75 The court wanted to avoid a pol-
icy that unduly burdened service providers and expressly “decline[d] to shift a
substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider.”76
The courts in that jurisdiction have continued to uphold and support the
precedent set in that significant case.77 In 2009, a California district court in the
copyright dispute between UMG and Veoh said that the case “teaches that if
investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to identify material as
infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not ‘red flags.’”78 The court
noted that this deliberately created a high bar for finding the existence of red
flags and that this “is yet another illustration of the principle underlying the
DMCA safe harbors, that the burden is on the copyright holder, not the service
provider, to identify copyright violations.”79
67 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
68 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007).
69 See id. at 1112–13; see Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 631, 635.
70 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1113.
71 Id. at 1108.
72 Id. at 1111–12.
73 Id. at 1112–13.
74 Id. at 1113.
75 Id. at 1114.
76 Id. at 1113.
77 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107–08
(C.D. Cal. 2009).
78 Id. at 1108.
79 Id. at 1111.
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In 2013, the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal regarding the principles of
the DMCA in a case between Universal Music Group and Veoh.80 After the
trial court granted summary judgment in Veoh’s favor, Universal Music Group
asserted on appeal that Veoh, a video sharing site similar to YouTube, should
be liable for vicarious and contributory infringement.81 As part of its defense,
Veoh argued that the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA protected it, and the
court considered what level of knowledge would be required for Veoh to be
compelled to remove the infringing material or lose its safe harbor protec-
tions.82 The Ninth Circuit found that “Veoh’s general knowledge that it hosted
copyrightable material and that its services could be used for infringement is
insufficient to constitute a red flag.”83 The court further reiterated that the bur-
den is generally on the copyright holder to identify infringing material since the
copyright holder was best positioned to determine what was infringing and
noted that Congress intended to create a system in which the copyright holders
and service providers would cooperate to help minimize infringement.84
Courts have also adamantly insisted that the knowledge of infringement
must be specific rather than general to trigger any risk of it being a red flag.
The district court in Viacom v. YouTube stated that “[g]eneral knowledge that
infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not impose a duty on the service provider to
monitor or search.”85 In reaching this conclusion, the district court looked at
previous cases that dealt directly with the DMCA and the knowledge require-
ments that kept to a narrow reading of the requirements.86 The court also
looked at analogous requirements in trademark law that required specific rather
than general knowledge, even when the possibly infringing material was being
made available “ubiquitously” and a generalized notice had been provided.87
This narrow reading of the red flag requirements has generally helped for-
ward the policy of providing online service providers with certainty as to what
they need to do to shelter themselves from liability for their users’ actions.88
But it has not prevented service providers from working with the content indus-
try to help limit infringement through measures such as YouTube’s Content ID
system.89 Content ID is a system created by YouTube to scan user-uploaded
80 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir.
2013).
81 Id. at 1013–14.
82 Id. at 1013–15.
83 Id. at 1023. Later, the court distinguished such general knowledge from actual induce-
ment and held that a service provider would still be liable if it induced infringement, but also
found that the test for inducement was not met in this case. Id. at 1031–33.
84 See id. at 1021–22; accord Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2007).
85 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
86 See id. at 524–25 (citing Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114, the district court’s decision in
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009),
and Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004)).
87 Id. (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2010) (dealing
with trademark infringement and trademark dilution when counterfeit Tiffany products were
being sold on eBay)).
88 This was one of the explicit goals of the DMCA. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at
49–50 (1998); see also Kravets, supra note 10.
89 Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
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videos to find those that match with previously identified copyright material.90
Depending on the options selected by the rights-holder, YouTube can then
either help the rights-holder monetize those videos through advertisement or
block those videos from the network to help minimize infringement.91 Accord-
ing to statistics provided by YouTube, over one-third of the monetized views
on YouTube come from videos identified by their Content ID system.92
B. Other Interpretations Favor Broad Safe Harbors
In addition to reading the safe harbors narrowly, courts have been reluc-
tant to impose other possible exceptions to the DMCA and have tended to read
analogous safe harbors broadly. In a lawsuit against Veoh Networks, the dis-
trict court stated that Veoh would not lose the protections of the safe harbor by
using software to process and automatically create new files derived from the
files submitted by its users.93 Veoh Networks ran a website that permitted users
to submit video content alongside videos provided by some of Veoh’s corpo-
rate partners and Veoh itself.94 Veoh described itself as an “Internet Television
Network.”95 When a user uploaded a video to Veoh, Veoh would convert that
video into the flash format and extract several images from the video, which
were used for displaying results on searches and to give potential viewers an
idea of the contents of the video.96 Veoh’s employees might also review certain
videos to ensure that the descriptions were accurate and that the video was
appropriately tagged, and would make changes they felt necessary to ensure
this accuracy.97
Io Group, Inc., filed a lawsuit regarding clips from its copyrighted produc-
tions that had been uploaded by users to the Veoh website, despite the fact that
it did not file takedown notices or otherwise inform Veoh of the possible copy-
right infringement prior to filing the suit.98 As part of the lawsuit, Io contended
that Veoh could not be protected by the safe harbors of the DMCA because it
did more than store the material provided by the user.99 Veoh processed the
files, created new versions of the files in a different format, took still images
from the files, and had employees review the files.100 Io contended that this
went beyond storage “at the direction of a user.”101 In response, the court stated
clearly that companies looking for shelter under the safe harbor of 17 U.S.C.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Jeff Bullas, 35 Mind Numbing YouTube Facts, Figures and Statistics – Infographic,
JEFFBULLAS.COM (May 23, 2012), http://www.jeffbullas.com/2012/05/23/35-mind-numbing
-youtube-facts-figures-and-statistics-infographic/.
93 Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008). This
ruling is consistent with other case law. Phong Dinh, Click Here To Share! The Impact of the
Veoh Litigations on Viacom v. Youtube, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 447, 459 (2009).
94 Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1139–40.
97 Id. at 1140.
98 Id. at 1137.
99 Id. at 1146.
100 Id. at 1139–40.
101 Id. at 1146 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)).
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§ 512(c) were “not limited to merely storing material.”102 The court reached its
conclusion by examining the structure of the statute and comparing it to 17
U.S.C. § 512(a).103 In particular, the court determined that employee review of
the material was no bar to the protections of the safe harbor.104 Nor would
automatic processing of the files, if processing was “a means of facilitating user
access to material on its website,” remove the protections offered by the stat-
ute.105 This paved the way for a district court to find in 2011 that the use of a
“standard data compression algorithm” would not endanger the protections of
the safe harbor.106 Some commentators have said that this ruling laid “the
ground rules” for other music locker services, such as the one created by
Amazon.107
That district court ruling was the result of the litigation between
MP3Tunes, L.L.C., and EMI, Inc.108 In this case, EMI argued that the DMCA
safe harbors did not apply when dealing with sound recordings created before
1972.109 EMI argued that sound recordings created prior to 1972 were covered
by state copyright and by common law and that federal copyright expressly
declined to preempt that protection when it was updated to provide copyright
protection to sound recordings.110 In looking at this as an issue of first impres-
sion, the court found that this interpretation of copyright would “eviscerate the
purpose of the DMCA,” which was meant to “foster fast and robust develop-
ment of the internet.”111 The court thus held that hosting a sound recording
created before 1972 would not breach the protections of the DMCA, and con-
tinued the line of court decisions that declined to create exceptions to the safe
harbor protections.112
Courts have also been consistent in reading an analogous law with a simi-
lar safe harbor to provide broad protections to Internet service providers while
leaving the openings to pierce those protections quite limited and narrow.113
One part of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)114 provides a safe har-
bor for Internet service providers by declaring that they are not the publisher of
content provided by their users.115 Courts have traditionally “treated § 230(c)
102 Id. at 1147.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1148.
106 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649–50 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
107 Timothy B. Lee, Record Labels Get Hollow Victory in MP3tunes Infringement Case,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/08
/record-labels-get-hollow-victory-in-mp3tunes-infringement-case/. See generally Dinh,
supra note 93 (noting that Io Group and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc. were
likely to be significant to other video sharing sites and may provide support for YouTube in
the ongoing litigation with Viacom).
108 Capitol Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
109 Id. at 640. See infra Part IV.A. for case discussion.
110 Capital Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 640–41.
111 Id. at 641–42.
112 Id.
113 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2003).
114 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
115 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
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immunity as quite robust” in providing protection from responsibility for a
wide variety of content, including defamation.116 Just as one intention of the
DMCA was to encourage the development of Internet service providers, Con-
gress enacted this immunity provision in order “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interac-
tive computer services.”117 This immunity had been unchallenged by the equi-
table doctrine of willful blindness and has few openings to impute liability.118
The CDA, however, like the DMCA, does not and should not provide protec-
tion when the illicit content was either created or solicited by the service pro-
vider.119 While the protections provided by the CDA are not perfectly
analogous to those provided by the DMCA,120 the interpretations of the CDA
do add to the line of cases that interpret limitations to protections for service
providers narrowly and view the protections themselves broadly. This trend,
both for the DMCA and the CDA, helps support the policy “to promote the
continued development of the Internet” by letting service providers move for-
ward with innovative services while being able to control their liability for
material provided to them.121
C. Willful Blindness in Viacom v. YouTube
Viacom v. YouTube was the first case that directly addressed the question
of whether the equitable doctrine of willful blindness could be applied to sub-
stitute for actual knowledge of infringement in order to strip an online service
provider of the protections of the DMCA’s safe harbor.122 In this sprawling
case, Viacom and other copyright holders accused YouTube of secondary cop-
yright infringement revolving around the video clips that YouTube hosts as the
core part of its service.123 YouTube is a video sharing and distribution service
that was founded in 2005 and purchased by Google in 2006.124 YouTube per-
mits its users to upload video clips, then hosts the clips, and allows other users
of YouTube to view them.125 Before it permits any user to upload a video, it
116 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. See also Liisa Thomas & Robert Newman, Social Network-
ing and Blogging: The New Legal Frontier, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 500, 501
(2009).
117 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
118 See Thomas & Newman, supra note 116, at 507–08.
119 Id. at 508–10.
120 See id. at 501, 507–510. The immunity provided by the CDA specifically does not apply
to intellectual property matters. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). Since this was excluded by the CDA and
the protections in the DMCA contain more limitations than those in the CDA, this could
imply that Congress intended courts not to apply interpretations of one Act to the other.
121 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(1). An analogous policy statement dealing with the safe harbors of
the DMCA is found in the statements of Senator Ashcroft. 144 CONG. REC. S4,889 (daily ed.
May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
122 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir. 2012).
123 Id. at 25–26. Viacom made several other accusations, however this note only discusses
the claims of secondary liability and how it is affected by the willful blindness doctrine and
the DMCA.
124 Id. at 28.
125 Id.
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requires the user to register and accept the terms of service, which, amongst
other things, requires the user to avoid uploading any infringing content.126
Viacom, along with several of its affiliates, filed the original suit alleging
a variety of copyright violations in March 2007.127 The Football Association
Premier League Limited, along with Bourne Co. Music Publishers, filed a simi-
lar class action suit in May of 2007, which the judge accepted as related.128 In
motions for summary judgment, the district court judge found that YouTube
had properly met all of the requirements necessary to qualify for the safe harbor
provisions provided by the DMCA and the plaintiffs subsequently appealed.129
In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the equitable doctrine of willful
blindness should be applied to impute knowledge of specific infringement
when the service provider “was aware of a high probability of the fact in dis-
pute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”130 The court considered
this as a matter of first impression.131 Further, the court found that willful
blindness could be used “in appropriate circumstances” to show sufficient
knowledge under the DMCA to place the service provider’s safe harbor protec-
tions at risk.132 In reaching this conclusion, it relied on the tradition that a
common law practice is only overridden by statute if it “speaks directly to the
question addressed by the common law.”133 The court noted that the DMCA
explicitly states that receiving safe harbor protection does not depend on the
“service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicat-
ing infringing activity.”134 However, the court found that this only narrows the
application of the common law doctrine of willful blindness, rather than abro-
gating it entirely.135 The court also analogized the law of copyrights to the law
of patents and trademarks, where willful blindness can be used to impute
knowledge.136 Therefore, it concluded that while a service provider does not
need to look for infringement, the service provider is not permitted to avoid
knowledge of infringement.137
In short, the Second Circuit concluded that willful blindness could support
a finding that the defendant possessed knowledge of circumstances sufficient to
trigger the red flag provision.138 The Second Circuit remanded the matter to the
126 Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2013). The requirement to have the legal authority to own the content is in
paragraph 6. Id. Related terms discussing account termination and the DMCA are in
paragraphs 7 and 8. Id.
127 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28.
128 Id. at 28–29.
129 Id. at 29.
130 Id. at 34–35 (quoting United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted)).
131 Id. at 34.
132 Id. at 35. The court does not specify in detail what “appropriate circumstances” means,
but indicates that the district court should consider along with other factors whether the
defendant made deliberate efforts to avoid knowledge. See id.
133 Id. (quoting Matar v. Dichter 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009)).
134 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2012)).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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District Court for consideration of the factual question.139 The district court, on
another motion for summary judgment, found, as a factual matter, that Viacom
failed to provide evidence that YouTube had willfully blinded itself.140 How-
ever, Viacom has appealed this ruling.141
IV. WILLFUL BLINDNESS AND UNCERTAINTY
A. The Cost of Litigation and Potential Litigation on Innovation
Allowing willful blindness to remove the safe harbors would significantly
impact the ways in which businesses that rely on safe harbors operate.142 This
impact should be a major concern of those examining the policy considerations
surrounding the issue of applying the willful blindness doctrine to the DMCA.
Although somewhat limited by the lack of requirement for service providers to
monitor their networks, permitting the willful blindness doctrine to be used to
impute knowledge weakens the protections provided by the safe harbors of the
DMCA.143 In creating the DMCA, Congress formed a careful balance between
the needs of copyright holders and the needs of the technological innovators.144
Congress was “loath to permit the specter of liability to chill innovation that
could also serve substantial socially beneficial functions.”145
Yet applying the common law doctrine of willful blindness to limit the
safe harbor functions of the DMCA may do precisely that. It creates another
avenue for a copyright holder to attack the protections provided by the DMCA,
and many copyright holders have proven willing to sue service providers that
are offering useful services to the public, which some consumers may also use
for copyright infringement.146 Even a slight reduction in the protections pro-
vided by the DMCA introduces uncertainty for the service provider in deter-
mining when they would or would not be liable for infringement.147
Such uncertainty will make many companies more hesitant to permit users
to engage in activities that may expose the service provider to liability.148
139 Id.
140 Viacom Int’l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-2103, 2013 WL 1689071, at *8–9
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
141 Wendy Davis, Viacom Asks Appeals Court to Reinstate YouTube Case, MEDIAPOST
(July. 29, 2013, 7:17 PM), available at http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article
/205619/#axzz2fZQDdt68. See also Timothy B. Lee, Court Hands Another Defeat to
Viacom in Never-Ending YouTube Lawsuit, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 18, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/court-hands-another-defeat-to-viacom-in-never--end
ing-youtube-lawsuit/.
142 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2011). See also EFF, supra note 51.
143 See discussion supra Parts III.A, III.C.
144 UMG Recordings, 667 F.3d at 1030, 1037.
145 Id. at 130.
146 See id. at 1037–38; Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34–35, (2d Cir.
2012); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007).
147 Permitting the doctrine of willful blindness to remove DMCA’s protections makes it less
clear when a service provider may be subject to liability by increasing the number of vari-
ables it must consider.
148 See EFF, supra note 51; Leary, supra note 45, at 1141; H.R. Rep. No 105-551, pt. 2, at
49–50 (1998).
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Moreover, it is likely to make many angel investors and venture capitalists,
who are essential to the growth of young corporations, hesitant to invest in
companies that engage in such activities.149 Investors have consistently shown
a preference for a clear regulatory regime over one clouded by ambiguity, and
they are especially shy of regulatory or legal changes that can increase liabil-
ity.150 Such a change in the legal landscape would not only noticeably reduce
the willingness of early-stage investments, but would also have a significant,
detrimental impact on the U.S. economy as a whole.151
Investors are naturally leery of investing in small companies with a high
likelihood of being sued, since the cost of litigation can drive some small, inno-
vative companies into bankruptcy even if the company is ultimately victorious
in the lawsuit.152 Veoh is one example of a company that, though generally
vindicated in court, was forced into bankruptcy by the expenses of litigation.153
MP3Tunes provides another example.154
MP3Tunes was a music site started by Michael Robertson that sold songs
from independent artists and provided a music locker service.155 As a music
locker service, MP3Tunes permitted users to upload songs, stored the songs for
users, and allowed users to retrieve or play the files stored on their behalf on
other devices.156 MP3Tunes also featured a number of innovations, such as its
“sideload” feature that let its users transfer certain music directly from other
websites to the user’s storage area on MP3Tunes.157 In order to make more
efficient use of its technological resources, MP3Tunes used deduplication tech-
149 In a report funded by Google, the Booz & Company consulting firm found that increased
liability and increased uncertainty were both major negative factors when angel investors
and venture capitalists considered investing in a young company. MATTHEW LE MERLE ET
AL., THE IMPACT OF U.S. INTERNET COPYRIGHT REGULATIONS ON EARLY-STAGE INVEST-
MENT 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo-Impact-US
-Internet-Copyright-Regulations-Early-Stage-Investment.pdf.
150 Id. One study believes that making the current copyright regulations clearer, rather than
more ambiguous as liability for willful blindness might, would increase the number of poten-
tial investors for certain types of online service providers by nearly 111 percent. Id. at 17.
151 Id. at 11.
Revenue from VC-backed companies accounts for 21 percent of total GDP, and employment at
these companies accounts for 11 percent of all U.S. jobs. Given the key role that angels and VCs
play, not only in funding new companies but also in working with them to promote their success,
their continued willingness to invest is critical to the future creation and growth of new
companies.
Id. (citation omitted).
152 See, e.g., Peter Kafka, Veoh Finally Calls It Quits: Layoffs Yesterday, Bankruptcy Filing
Soon, CNET (Feb. 11, 2010, 1:34 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10452152-93
.html; Mike Masnick, EMI Kills Off More Innovation: MP3Tunes Declares Bankruptcy Due
to “Withering” Legal Costs, TECHDIRT (May 11, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.techdirt.com
/articles/20120511/11203118884/emi-kills-off-more-innovation-mp3tunes-declares-bankrupt
cy-due-to-withering-legal-costs.shtml.
153 See Kafka, supra note 152. See also discussion of the Veoh case supra Part III.A.
154 Mike Freeman, MP3tunes Music Locker Service Files for Bankruptcy, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 11, 2012, at C-1, available at http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012
/may/11/mp3tunes-music-locker-service-files-bankruptcy/.
155 Capital Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 633–634 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 634; Lee, supra note 107.
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niques,158 which replaced duplicates of a piece of information with a reference
to one single copy.159 EMI sued MP3tunes in 2007 for copyright infringe-
ment.160 On summary judgment, the court declared that MP3Tunes was gener-
ally protected by the safe harbors of the DMCA in its normal operations.161
The court also found that the use of deduplication technology would not
remove the protections of the safe harbor.162 Further, the court noted that this
deduplication was essentially a standard software technique that “eliminates
redundant digital data” and distinguished it from the idea of a master copy.163
Despite these significant legal victories, the legal costs that MP3Tunes had
accrued were sufficient to force the company to file for bankruptcy.164
Permitting the doctrine of willful blindness to weaken the statutory safe
harbors would tighten the regulatory grip of copyright over the technology
industries. Increasing this grip can reduce both innovation and investment.165
“Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives dinosaurs a
veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity for a democratic
creativity that digital technology enables.”166 The courts have also considered
the impact of tighter regulation and found that “[t]he more artistic protection is
favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged.”167 In fact,
there is evidence that litigation already limits innovation and investment in
innovative companies, to the point that it has led to a “venture capital
‘wasteland.’”168
158 Capital Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649–50; Peter Kafka, Why the MP3Tunes Case Is a
Big Deal You Won’t Notice, ALLTHINGSD (Aug. 23, 2011, 7:26 AM), http://allthingsd.com
/20110823/why-the-mp3tunes-case-is-a-big-deal-you-wont-notice/.
159 Data Deduplication, EMC GLOSSARY, http://www.emc.com/corporate/glossary/data-de
duplication.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
160 Capital Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
161 Id. at 646. Although the service was eligible for the safe harbors of the DMCA for most
of the songs it stored, it did not qualify for certain select songs for which it did not properly
and fully comply with the necessary takedown procedures. Id.
162 See id. at 649–50. See also Lee, supra note 106.
163 Capital Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649–50 (distinguishing this case, in its exploration
of the idea of a master copy, from the situation in Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings,
Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008)).
164 Freeman, supra note 153. See also Greg Sandoval, MP3tunes.com Locker Service Files
for Bankruptcy, CNET (May 10, 2012, 2:12 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3
-57432129-93/mp3tunes.com-locker-service-files-for-bankruptcy-exclusive/. However, EMI
publicly alleged that MP3Tunes.com filed for bankruptcy protection to avoid the liabilities
for which it is not fully protected by the DMCA. Greg Sandoval, EMI Says Bankruptcy
Won’t Protect MP3tunes from Copyright Suit, CNET (May 10, 2012, 4:59 PM), http://news
.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57432278-93/emi-says-bankruptcy-wont-protect-mp3tunes-from
-copyright-suit/.
165 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 199 (2004), available at http://www.free-culture.cc
/freeculture.pdf.
166 Id.
167 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005).
168 Timothy B. Lee, Study: Label Litigation Has Produced an Innovation “Wasteland”,
ARS TECHNICA (July 26, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/study
-label-litigation-has-produced-an-innovation-wasteland/.
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B. The Difficulty of Service Providers Determining What Must Be Removed
The difficulty in determining what is actually infringing further compli-
cates the question of when to apply the doctrine of willful blindness. For
instance, any material that is derived from a copyright work, but covered under
the fair use exceptions, does not need to be removed.169 In fact, in limited
circumstances, a court has held a company liable for damages when it used the
DMCA takedown process to have material removed that was clearly covered
by fair use.170 The determination that a work is actually covered by copyright,
but not covered by the fair use exceptions, is a complicated one that most ser-
vice providers are not equipped to make.171 Moreover, even if the material is
clearly copyrighted, it is not always clear that its posting is not validly
authorized.172
Content producers may post sections of copyrighted material or even
entire copyrighted works to various Internet sites in an effort to promote that
material or the artist.173 Moreover, there have been cases of DMCA takedown
notices or other legal action by the legal department or other agent of a copy-
right holding corporation even when an agent of the marketing department of
169 Before filing a DMCA takedown notice, a copyright holder is required to consider fair
use. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008). However,
a “mere failure to consider fair use would be insufficient to give rise to liability under
§ 512(f).” Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783, 2013 WL 271673, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (order denying cross-motions for summary judgment).
170 A court has found liability under section 512(f) of the DMCA for a copyright holder that
attempted to use the takedown process of the DMCA primarily “as a sword to suppress
publication of embarrassing content” when the copyright holder flagrantly ignored a clear
fair use exception. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204–05
(N.D. Cal. 2004). However, another court has found that using scanning software without
any human oversight can be acceptable without necessarily giving rise to liability for failing
to consider fair use. Ouellette v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., No. cv-10-133, 2012 WL 850921, at *5
(D. Mont. Mar. 13, 2012).
171 Part of the reason fair use can be difficult to determine at times is that there are only
factors to be considered rather than a clear criteria. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1990). See also David Nimmer, “Fairest of
Them All” and other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 283–84
(2003); Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 630; Jonathan McIntosh, “Buffy vs Edward”
Remix Unfairly Removed by Lionsgate, ARS TECHNICA (Jan 9, 2013, 7:40 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/buffy-vs-edward-remix-unfairly-removed-by-lions
gate/.
172 In one example, a music blog was accused of infringement despite having some evi-
dence that its use of the material was authorized by the copyright holders. Timothy B. Lee,
ICE Admits Year-Long Seizure of Music Blog Was a Mistake, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 8, 2011,
3:14 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/12/ice-admits-months-long-seizure-of
-music-blog-was-a-mistake/. Similarly, some of the videos that Viacom sued YouTube over
seem to have been uploaded to YouTube by marketing agencies authorized by Viacom.
Wendy Davis, YouTube Accuses Viacom of Secretly Uploading Clips, MEDIAPOST (Mar. 18,
2010, 8:16 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/124549/youtube-accuses
-viacom-of-secretly-uploading-clips.html#axzz2cApJzpPu.
173 Laura Sydell, Is YouTube the New MTV?, NPR (June 03, 2009, 11:13 AM), http://www
.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104871526 (discussing how music companies
use YouTube for talent acquisition, promotion for talent already signed with the label, and to
gather data).
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the same company posted the material in question.174 Thus, even a properly
submitted takedown notice cannot be taken as proof that the material was origi-
nally unauthorized.175 There was even an incident of an agent of a company
submitting a takedown notice for material posted by the content owner itself to
a website owned by the content owner.176 Similarly, a copyright holder may
deliberately choose to overlook infringing content, at least for a time, in order
to benefit from the notoriety that such exposure can bring.177 This strategy of
tolerating some infringement and releasing tracks freely can be part of a viral
marketing campaign.178 These factors, which often can only be fully deter-
mined by the copyright holder, make it exceptionally difficult for the service
provider to investigate whether the material is infringing. They also make it
time consuming to determine if the copyright holder may want to deliberately
overlook that particular infringing material for a time.179
Since it is difficult for service providers to tell what is infringing and what
is not, it is difficult for them to determine what actions could be interpreted as
being willfully blind and where to draw the line that would cause them to need
to investigate further. For instance, a service provider may be aware of content
which is explicitly marked as illegal or stolen, but, especially in the case of
salacious content, it may have been marked that way to increase its appeal, and
174 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 31. Also, EMI filed takedown notices with MP3tunes
.com over certain songs where “EMI authorized the free distribution of songs,” though it
may have intended for users to visit only specific websites to get those songs. Capitol
Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
175 The government seized a blog dealing with hip-hop music due to copyright claims; the
blog owner asserted in its defense that it complied with the DMCA takedown process and
that the music labels released the content in question. Timothy B. Lee, Waiting on the RIAA,
Feds Held Seized Dajaz1 Domain for Months, ARS TECHNICA (May 4, 2012, 8:41 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/05/waiting-on-the-riaa-feds-held-seized-dajaz1-do
main-for-months/. Also, some blogs hosted by Google’s Blogger received takedown notices
and eventually had their accounts suspended, despite having evidence that authorized mar-
keting agents provided the allegedly infringing files to them. Anderson, supra note 31. See
also Davis, supra note 172.
176 DtecNet DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Dec. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=725782#FAQID655847. Dtec
Net, on behalf of HBO, sent a takedown notice for content posted by HBO on HBO.com. Id.
The notice does this at infringing URLs seventeen to twenty-two for Eastbound and Down.
Id. See also Mike Masnick, How Much Does HBO Pay MarkMonitor to Send DMCA Notices
Removing Its Official Content From Google?, TECHDIRT (Feb. 5, 2013, 11:31 AM), http://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20130205/03124421884/how-much-does-hbo-pay-markmonitor
-to-send-techdmca-notices-removing-its-official-content-google.shtml.
177 Anna Katz, Copyright in Cyberspace: Why Owners Should Bear the Burden of Identify-
ing Infringing Materials Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 18 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 343, 359–60 (2012). Copyright owners may also benefit from certain types of
derivative works and choose to ignore them even while they technically violate the copy-
right. Lawrence Lessig discusses this in context of Japanese doujinshi, a type of comic book,
and says that some of the original creators tolerate it intentionally and others turn a blind eye
because it is not worth the resources to crack down. LESSIG, supra note 165, at 25–27.
178 See Capital Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 647; Katz, supra note 177, at 371.
179 The only way to know if the copyright holder is deliberately overlooking it is to contact
the copyright holder and ask. See Katz, supra note 176, at 359–60 and surrounding
discussion.
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such labels by themselves do not constitute red flags for infringement.180 But it
is possible that content labeled in that way and then ignored by the service
provider may require them to investigate to avoid being declared willfully blind
to a specific case of infringement.
Even the possibility that certain content might expose service providers to
liability if it appeared they were willfully blind could cause a service provider
to begin some basic monitoring and censoring of possibly legitimate speech.181
Before the specter of willful blindness had arisen as a way to pierce the safe
harbor protections, some strategists had advised service providers to reduce
monitoring to ensure that they did not cross the “facts and circumstances” stan-
dard explicitly laid out in the DMCA.182 But if an attack on the safe harbors
through claims of willful blindness becomes possible, these companies may
begin monitoring aggressively.183
Moreover, there are some actions that could appear to be willful blindness
or a deliberate avoidance of knowledge, which are yet done for a valid business
reason. For instance, service providers may deliberately store material
encrypted in a way that the service provider itself cannot decrypt. They may do
this in order to avoid knowledge of infringement or other illegal material that is
stored on their network. Certainly the safe harbors will not and should not pro-
vide them protection if they induce infringement by encouraging their users to
trade infringing material and structuring their services specifically to deal in
infringing material.184 But they may also encrypt it in that way simply to pro-
tect the privacy of more legitimate uses, such as providing services to busi-
nesses which need to deal with confidential or privileged information.185
SpiderOak, for instance, is a file storage service that automatically encrypts the
files it stores to protect the privacy and provide security to its clients.186 A
doctrine that permits willful blindness to increase the risk of liability may pre-
vent such a service from ever developing or cause that service to shut down.187
180 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007).
181 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 639–40.
182 Id. See also discussion supra Part III.A.
183 Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 640.
184 One example of this was provided by Aimster, a file sharing service that used cryptogra-
phy automatically. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2003).
Aimster specifically advertised itself as a way to get songs, which were almost invariably
infringing. Id. at 651–52. Aimster’s obvious invitation to infringe copyrighted music and
intentional actions to avoid even the ability to limit that infringement was sufficient to
expose it to the potential of liability. Id. at 655. However, even in that opinion the court
emphasized that it was not the policy “to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement
effectuated by means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying non-infringing
consumers the benefit of the technology.” Id. at 649. The court also stated directly that
encryption has valid uses and that merely providing an encrypted service is not sufficient to
show contributory infringement. Id. at 650.
185 Andrew Cunningham, SpiderOak: Dropbox for the Security Obsessive, ARS TECHNICA
(Apr. 4, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/04/spideroak-dropbox-for
-the-security-obsessive/.
186 Id.
187 The risk of liability can cause services to never be developed or to be stripped down to
remove those risks of liability. See discussion supra Parts II.B, IV.A.
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V. SAFE HARBORS IN FOREIGN LANDS
Examining similar and related legislation used by other countries often
provides additional insights into ways to address the problem the law was
meant to solve. Other nations have implemented laws to create safe harbors for
service providers similar to the ones provided in the DMCA.188 These laws,
like the DMCA,189 often implement the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and, at
the same time, create some form of safe harbor for online service providers.190
This treaty explicitly recognizes the “need to maintain a balance between the
rights of authors and the larger public interest.”191 Those making and analyzing
these laws also often focus on the importance of protecting innovation. For
instance, while examining their own safe harbors, the Australian Government
released a report titled Australia’s Digital Economy: Future Directions that
stated “[u]ncertainty about whether newer digital economy platforms are cov-
ered by the safe harbour may interfere with the ability [of] providers of these
platforms to effectively develop business models in Australia.”192 This report
further noted that many of the more innovative services had been developed in
the United States, which had broader safe harbors for online service providers.
The report suggested that increasing the safe harbors in Australia would
remove barriers on businesses and provider greater certainty, which would
attract further investment to Australia.193
Although several different countries have tried to address the same
problems, conform to the same treaties, and have tried to balance the needs of
the different stakeholders, they have attempted to strike this balance in slightly
different ways.194 For instance, safe harbors similar to those in the DMCA are
found in the European Union in the form of the 2000 Directive on Electronic
Commerce (“ECD”).195 The European Union took a more horizontal approach,
protecting from liability any unlawful content provided to a service provider by
the user under the same standards.196 This contrasts with the approach in the
United States, where the DMCA provides limitations on liability only for copy-
188 YiJun Tian, WIPO Treaties, Free Trade Agreement and Implications for ISP Safe Har-
bour Provisions (The Role of ISP in Australian Copyright Law), 16 BOND L. REV. 186,
186–87 (2004).
189 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1 (1998).
190 Tian, supra note 188, at 187.
191 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty, Preamble, Dec. 20,
1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), available at http://www
.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.
192 AUSTL. GOV’T: DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., AUSTRA-
LIA’S DIGITAL ECONOMY: FUTURE DIRECTIONS 21 (2009), available at http://www.archive
.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/117681/DIGITAL_ECONOMY_FUTURE_DI
RECTIONS_FINAL_REPORT.pdf.
193 Id. at 22.
194 See generally Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, The Notice and Takedown Procedure Under
Copyright Law: Developing a Measured Approach, 13 U. NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REV. 193
(2011) (providing a brief overview and comparison of the different notice and takedown
regimes in different parts of the world, with emphasis on Australia).
195 See generally Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counter-
parts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481
(2009) (providing an overview of the ECD and comparing it with the DMCA).
196 Id. at 482.
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right, and service providers are protected against claims of defamation or other
causes of action by other sections of the law that may use different stan-
dards.197 While the DMCA prescribes tight limits on the forms of injunctive
relief that a court may issue on a copyright matter while the service provider
falls under its ambit, the ECD specifically avoids limiting injunctive options.198
Where the DMCA has a specific and formal takedown process, the ECD rather
prescribes a more open-ended process that has relatively few specifics about
what the notice requesting a takedown must include.199
There have been cases where a court’s opinion that a company does not
qualify for the safe harbor protections of the ECD resulted in the company
shutting down any portions of the website which did not qualify for the liabil-
ity.200 For instance, the website Fuzz.fr was closed after it was denied the pro-
tections of the safe harbors in France.201 Fuzz.fr, owned by Bloobox Net, acted
as a social news site202 and hosted links submitted by users which it organized
and displayed based on the links’ popularity amongst the sites users.203 The
Law on Confidence in the Digital Economy, which is the implementation of the
ECD in France, stated that publishers, as opposed to pure hosting service prov-
iders, were not eligible for safe harbor protections.204 Since Fuzz.fr classified
the links submitted to it and controlled the way the links were organized and
presented on the site, the Paris Court of First Instance ruled that Fuzz.fr was a
publisher and therefore could not be immune to liability generated by user-
submitted material.205 In making this ruling, the court seemed to focus on the
“general structure of the site and how it ranks and displays links,” rather than
on any specific decisions or actions the site took regarding any particular link
in question.206 This lack of immunity led to the site’s shutdown207 and provides
an example of narrow safe harbors that do not cover a particular service leading
directly to the destruction of a business.
VI. CERTAINTY, BLINDNESS, AND INVESTMENT
Eliminating any consideration of willful blindness under the DMCA and
continuing to interpret the red flag provision narrowly would best balance the
197 Id. at 483–84. The limitations on liability for defamation are provided by the Communi-
cations Decency Act, which is codified in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012).
198 Peguera, supra note 194, at 486. However, a member country may choose to limit
injunctions when implementing the directive. Id. at 487.
199 Id. at 490–91.
200 Bradley L. Joslove & Vanessa De Spiegeleer-Delort, Web 2.0: Aggregator Website Held
Liable as Publisher, INT’L LAW OFF. (June 26, 2008), http://www.internationallawoffice
.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=4b014ec1-b334-4204-9fbd-00e05bf6db95.
201 Id.
202 Id. Social news sites generally allow users to submit links to news sources and allow
other users to vote on their importance and relevance.
203 Michael Vatis & David Retchless, User-Generated Content: Website Liability, 10 E-
COM. L. & POL’Y 3, 6 (2008), available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/3634
.pdf.
204 Joslove & De Spiegeleer-Delort, supra note 200.
205 Vatis & Retchless, supra note 203, at 6–7.
206 Id. at 7.
207 Joslove & De Spiegeleer-Delort, supra note 200.
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relationship between the tech industry and content creators. Copyright law in
general is a delicate balance of the interests of all those that are affected by
it.208 The damage that would be done to Internet service providers by the
uncertainty, increased liability, and increased litigation that would result from
the application of the willful blindness doctrine or from a broad reading of the
red flag provision substantially outweighs the small benefit to the copyright
holders and the content industries that would result from shifting this bal-
ance.209 Moreover, the harm that would be caused by the willful blindness doc-
trine to the Internet service provider industry would directly affect consumers
by reducing the rate at which new, innovative services could be brought onto
the market.210
As the courts have wisely noted, Congress placed the burden for protect-
ing material primarily upon the content producers themselves.211 That arrange-
ment and the certainty that the system currently provides for a service provider
operating in good faith that wishes to avoid exposure to liability, has helped
new, innovative services to thrive.212 This does not of course mean that any
service provider that actively encourages infringement or goes out of its way to
specifically facilitate infringing activity should be sheltered, and service prov-
iders that are directly participating in infringement themselves should be shut
down.213
It is of great importance to ensure that the creators of music, art, film,
literature, and other works have a way to exercise some control over their cre-
ations and to gain compensation for their work. Copyright is an effective vehi-
cle for managing both. But the main purpose of copyright historically has been
and should remain the furtherance of the public good.214 Copyright law best
serves the public good by maintaining appropriate balances.215 For instance, it
grants the protections of copyright to a creator so they can earn compensation
for their work, but only for a limited time since many creative works are built
on prior creative works. Indeed, “[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art,
there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly
new and original throughout.”216
Similarly, the DMCA does and must grant copyright holders an effective
way to limit infringement and help them ensure they can earn remuneration for
their creative works. But it must do so in a way that is balanced with protec-
tions for companies and institutions that provide valuable services on the
208 As just one example, the Supreme Court has stated that copyright “creates a balance
between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and
the public’s need for access to creative works.” Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).
209 These damages include difficulties in getting investments as well as the expenses that
such litigation or settlements would directly cause. See discussion supra Parts II.B, IV.A.
210 See Kravets, supra note 10. See also EFF, supra note 51.
211 See discussion supra Part III.A.
212 See discussion supra Part II.B.
213 It is fully proper, justified, and perhaps necessary to punish true piracy. LESSIG, supra
note 164, at 10.
214 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431–32 (1984).
215 LESSIG, supra note 164, at 10. See also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990);
H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
216 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845).
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Internet. Placing a heavy burden for preventing infringement on service provid-
ers would have a chilling effect on the market for investing in Internet ser-
vices.217 Many useful companies would likely never be formed due to fear of
the liability they would have. Others would be brought into existence, but in a
stunted and twisted form designed to limit the activities of their users to prevent
any possibility of liability for infringement.218
In a market where companies were ruled by the fear of crushing copyright
liability, YouTube may never have been formed. While YouTube does, by its
nature, make certain infringing uses easier, it also provides a platform which
has been used by politicians and pundits to help distribute their messages, con-
tent producers to help legitimately promote their products, and end-users to
simply express themselves.219 Similarly, a platform like WordPress which
makes it simple for anyone to set up a blog to share information, express their
opinions, or promote a position may never have come into being.220 Other web-
sites that exist to distribute their own content would likely exist, but would
encourage their users to be simply passive consumers rather than active partici-
pants, which join the conversation by posting their own comments that may
contain multi-media elements and have the potential to violate someone’s
copyright.
Even a small increase in the risk of liability may cause service providers to
more aggressively filter and preemptively remove content.221 This could cause
legitimate speech to be stifled.222 There have already been many cases of a
service provider incorrectly identifying material as being infringing when it is
not and thus silencing, at least temporarily, someone trying to exercise his right
to free speech.223 This has happened in some cases where the speech in ques-
tion was a political discussion intended to sway voters before an election, and
217 One study conducted interviews of venture capitalists and found that nearly all said
removing the safe harbors currently in place would have a negative impact on investment. LE
MERLE ET AL., supra note 149, at 19. While permitting willful blindness to strip a company
of its protection is far from entirely removing them, it certainly creates a major exception
and weakens the protection afforded by the safe harbors of the DMCA.
218 Some companies in other countries with different safe harbors have policies of monitor-
ing and preapproving any comments their users may make in their forums in an effort to
minimize liability. See Drew Cullen, It’s Bloody Hard to Run a Forum (in Sweden), THE
REGISTER (Mar. 8, 2002, 11:53 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/03/08/its_bloody_
hard_to_run/ (discussing the moderation used by some forum operators in Sweden in order
to limit their liability). Aereo, a company that allows users to tune into broadcast television
over the internet, chose to use one antenna per customer rather than one more powerful
antenna that could record all broadcast television precisely in an attempt to comply with the
copyright law as interpreted by previous courts. Empson, supra note 52.
219 See, e.g., Meryl K. Evans, 34 Ways to Use YouTube for Business, GIGAOM (July 28,
2009, 9:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2009/07/28/34-ways-to-use-youtube-for-business/.
220 About Us, WORDPRESS, http://en.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
221 See Cullen, supra note 217.
222 See David Abrams, More Chilling than the DMCA – Automated Takedowns, CHILLING
EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?Wea
therID=634.
223 See Mike Masnick, Insanity: Romney’s Ad Featuring Obama Singing Al Green Shut
Down Via Copyright Claim, TECHDIRT (July 17, 2012, 8:18 AM), http://www.techdirt.com
/articles/20120717/02364219725/insanity-romneys-ad-featuring-obama-singing-al-green
-shut-down-via-copyright-claim.shtml.
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thus time sensitive so that even brief unavailability or reduced availability
could have an impact on the usefulness of the material.224 There have also been
many cases of content creators mistakenly identifying innocent content as being
infringing,225 especially when those content creators are given tools to remove
content that bypass the formalities in place under the DMCA.226 Such cases,
which can make legitimate content harder to find and silence a voice trying to
express itself, would likely be more common if it became easier for a service
provider to lose the protections of the DMCA’s safe harbor.
It would be a dramatic loss to the public to have a forum like the Internet
become less amenable to the average user expressing his or her thoughts,
beliefs, and opinions. It would be an even more dramatic loss to the public to
have service providers stop providing innovative services, and it would be the
small, innovative companies that are pushing the envelope that would suffer the
most from a more restrictive environment.227 Additionally, it would be a major
loss to the economy to have the growth of services on the Internet and the
growth of Internet companies stunted. The Internet has proven to be a massive
driver of the economy and creator of jobs.228 It also has secondary effects on
the market by making other activities, which used to be difficult, much easier
than they were before.229
Furthermore, advances in technology often create new markets for content
that were not available before.230 It was the development of the printing press
that both made the mass production of books possible and the first copyright
laws necessary.231 The development of the records and cassette tapes created
the market for recorded music at the same time it made mass piracy of music
possible.232 The development of video cassettes followed by DVDs, Blu-Rays,
and legitimate digital film distribution created the market for home videos,
which is now a major component of movie studio revenues, even though it
made movie piracy possible.233 Many of these new technologies were greeted
224 Id.
225 One study suggests that as much as thirty-one percent of takedown notices involved
material that would have presented “significant questions related to the underlying copyright
claim” due to issues such as a fair use defense or the involvement non-copyrightable mate-
rial. Urban & Quilter, supra note 20, at 667.
226 Abrams, supra note 222.
227 Small, newly formed companies are the most in need of capital, which is harder to find
in the face of greater risks of liability and greater uncertainty. See supra notes 148–50 and
accompanying text.
228 A study by the McKinsey Global Institute found that the “the Internet accounts for, on
average, 3.4 percent of GDP” in certain mature economies, and that in some countries “the
Internet accounted for 10 percent of GDP growth over the past 15 years.” MATTHIEU P´ELIS-
SI ´E DU RAUSAS ET AL., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH,
JOBS, AND PROSPERITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/features/sizing_the_
internet_economy.
229 See id. at 2–3.
230 BOYLE, supra note 2, at 63–64 (discussing the creation of new markets through new
technologies for reproduction and distribution, focusing on the example of videocassettes).
231 Id. at 61.
232 LESSIG, supra note 164, at 69.
233 See BOYLE, supra note 2, at 64; Mike Snider, Blu-ray Grows, But DVD Slide Nips Home
Video Sales, USA TODAY (Jan. 9, 2012, 8:33 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech
/news/story/2012-01-10/blu-ray-sales-2011/52473310/1.
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by lawsuits, legislation, or both in order to control them and control their
impact on copyright infringement.234 Such evolutions of the law are necessary
and infringement should be minimized. But efforts to control infringement
should always be balanced with the need to also protect the nascent technology
and should be created with the knowledge that history shows that technology
frequently creates new opportunities and new markets for content creators,
even as it makes infringement and unauthorized use easier.235
Therefore, while the protections the DMCA gives to copyright holders
should be strong, the protections given to service providers should also remain
strong and should not be weakened by the introduction of common law doc-
trines or expansive readings of the ways in which such protections can be lost.
This balancing would provide reasonable tools to copyright holders while pro-
tecting emerging enterprises and ensuring the benefits of the advances in tech-
nology to the public at large. This balancing is also the best way to protect the
economic benefits that come from an ever more useful Internet filled with inno-
vative service providers willing to try new service models, while still providing
a reasonable level of protection for copyright holders and the content industry.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was meant as a compromise
between the technology industries and copyright industries, and it walks a line
attempting to balance the needs of both industries while also respecting the
concerns of the public. One crucial way it maintains this equilibrium is by
granting copyright holders a swift and expedient way to remove infringing con-
tent from online service providers while providing a means by which those
online service providers can be assured of a safe harbor from the exposure to
legal liability. This balance has benefitted both industries, and has been seen as
so crucial that some have credited it with saving the web. Without these safe
harbors, many online service providers, which play a vital role both in facilitat-
ing public communication and in advancing the digital economy, would likely
have withered away, or survived only in a shrunken form evolved specifically
to avoid the types of liability that can kill a small startup.
Many companies that were found by courts to fall outside these safe
harbors suffered exactly that fate. Some of them indeed should have. There is
no room in a law-abiding society for a company that directly and intentionally
encourages its users to disregard copyright and that has little or no other pur-
pose than to facilitate infringement. Yet, these safe harbors have allowed many
valuable and useful service providers to thrive without fear of liability.
Allowing the equitable doctrine of willful blindness to breach safe harbors
would reduce these vital protections, and reduce the certainty and confidence
with which service providers may act. Creating uncertainty can, in some ways,
be worse than the actual liability to which service providers could be exposed.
This is because the danger of litigation and liability will cause Internet busi-
nesses and their investors to become unnecessarily cautious, which reduces
234 BOYLE, supra note 2, at 63–64.
235 See id. at 64–65.
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experimentation and reduces innovation. Moreover, this would go against the
judicial trend of granting the service providers broad protection and could com-
pel service providers to begin censoring their own users to avoid the risk of
being declared willfully blind and thus open to liability. That would go against
the policies announced by those prior courts granting broad protection to ser-
vice providers and against the policies announced in the congressional debates
leading up to the passing of the DMCA. In order to properly maintain the bal-
ance, there should be no circumstances under which the doctrine of willful
blindness is applied to limit the protections of the DMCA’s safe harbors.
